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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the final judgment rendered
below pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j) (1953).
II.

A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Whether the District Court's Findings of Fact numbered 5,

6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 26 were clearly erroneous being
without

any

evidentiary

foundation

requiring

reversal

of

the

judgment and a new trial.1
B.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that JONES'

action was not commenced within the time required by Utah Code Ann.
§78-14-4 (1953), when JONES did not know and had no reason to know
that he had sustained a legal injury prior to September 15, 1987.2
C.

Whether the District Court erred, by failing to properly

consider that the "knowledge of injury" prong of the Foil test,

x

The appellate court will not set aside a trial court's
findings of facts unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is
"clearly erroneous" when the appellate court, after reviewing the
record, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. An appellate court will regard a finding as clearly
erroneous when the finding is unsupported by the evidence*. To
challenge a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must
demonstrate the findings are against the clear weight of the
evidence.
2

A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law reviewed on appeal de novo. Ward v. Richfield City,
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). Similarly, the appellate court accords
the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but
reviews them for de novo. Bonham v. Morgan, 778 P.2d 497, 499
(Utah 1989); State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347
(Utah 1990); Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980);
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah
1988).

1

tolled the two year limitations period until JONES knew or should
have known of the full nature, extent, severity and permanence of
his injury.2
D.

Whether the District Court erred, as a matter of law, by

failing to properly apply the "knowledge of negligence" prong of
the Foil which tolled the two year limitations period until JONES
knew or has reason to know the cause of his injury and the
potential negligence of Defendants.2
E.

Whether the District Court erred, in concluding that the

"continuing treatment doctrine" adopted by the Supreme Court in
Peteler v. Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932) is no longer
applicable law in light of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1953).2
F.

Whether the District Court erred, in concluding that the

"continuing treatment doctrine" would not apply to this case, where
JONES was under continuous treatment by Defendants from 1984 until
after December, 1987, because JONES knew of the existence of his
injury and possible.2
III. APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah
amended.

Code Ann. §§78-14-4, 78-14-8, 78-14-12
See infra Addendum.

2

(1953), as

STATEMENT OF THE CASE3

IV.
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Thi3

is

a

Plaintiff/Appellant
injuries

which

medical
G.

malpractice

Kevin

include,

Jones

among

action

(JONES)

other

seeks

in

which

damages

things, permanent

for

sexual

dysfunction as a result of negligent surgery and care rendered by
Defendants and their agents.
B.

PL. at 2-8, Plaintiff's Complaint.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

On December 4, 1987, a Notice of Intent to Commence Action was
served on Defendants pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-14-8

(1953).

See

Plaintiff's

Exhibit

No.

1; PL.

at

3,

Plaintiff's Complaint 15. On January 15, 1988, a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review and a copy of said Notice of Intent to
Commence Action were
Business

Regulation

filed with the Utah State Department
and

served

on Defendants

pursuant

of

to the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-12 (1953). Plaintiff's Exhibit
No.

2; PL. at 3, Plaintiff's Complaint

hearing

was

held

before

the

55.

Division

of

A pre-litigation
Occupational

and

Professional Licensing, Department of Business Regulation.

The

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing subsequently
issued and mailed to the parties its opinion and its affidavit of
compliance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-12 (1953).

3

The record in this action consists
pleadings (hereinafter PL.), four volumes
(hereinafter TR.) and exhibits. References
are noted first to the record or exhibit, and
page.
For example, PL. at
, TR. at
Exhibit No.

3

of three volumes of
of trial transcripts
in Plaintiff's Brief
then to the paginated
or Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 3; PL. at 3, Plaintiff's Complaint 15.
JONES' Complaint was filed on April 26, 1988.

PL. at 2-9.

The trial was bifurcated to determine whether JONES' claim was
timely filed pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah
Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1953). The bifurcated trial was prosecuted to
the District Court without a jury on November 12, 13 and 15, 1991.
PL. at 1090.
The District Court ruled that the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations because JONES had failed to commence the
action within two years from the date he knew or reasonably should
have known that he sustained an injury that was caused by an act of
Defendants.

PL. at

1046,

(Court's Decision); PL. at 1085,

(Findings of Fact); PL. at 1091, (Judgment).
The District Court, with some changes, approved Defendant's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. PL. at 1064a-1070; PL. at
1083-1088; PL. at 1093. Judgment was entered on January 23, 1992.
PL. at 1091. On February 3, 1992, JONES filed a Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial.
1095-1105.
1992.

PL. at

JONES' Motion for New Trial was denied on March 6,

PL. at 1118.

JONES thereafter filed a timely Notice of

Appeal on April 6, 1992. PL. at 1120-1121.
V.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS4

From December 29, 1983 through January, 1987, JONES was

under the care of Defendant James M. Becker, M.D. ("BECKER"), who
was an agent

and employee of other Defendants named herein

4

For a more detailed statement of facts, see PL. 531-45.
4

("HOSPITAL").

PL. at 532; TR. at 1393 lines 7-11, at 1395 lines

16-20, at 1430 lines 12-13, at 1432 lines 17-19, (testimony of G.
Kevin

Jones);

TR. at

1180 lines

14-15,

(testimony

of Dr.

J.

Becker).
2.

JONES was admitted to University Hospital to undergo the

Ileal Pouch - Anal Anastomosis, a new, major surgical procedure for
the treatment of chronic ulcerative colitis.

TR. at 1391 lines 6-

8, at 1395 lines 16-25, at 1396 lines 1-25, at 1397 lines 1-5,
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1192 lines 12-25, at 1193
lines 1-25, at 1194 lines 1-25, at 1195 lines 1-25, at 1209 lines
13-14, at 1212 lines 1-25, at 1213 lines 1-2, (testimony of Dr. J.
Becker); Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5.
3.

Within

weeks

of being

released

from

the

University

Hospital on April 16, 1984, for treatment arising from his second
surgery on February 27, 1984, JONES began to be aware that he was
suffering some sexual disability.

TR. at 1410 at lines 8-25, at

1411 lines 1-25, (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
dysfunctions, which still exist today, include:
ejaculation,

(2)

interrupted climax.

diminished

quality

of

JONES' sexual
(1) loss of

erections,

and

(3)

TR. at 1410, lines 19-25; TR. at 1411, lines

1-25; TR. at 1412, lines 1-10, (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
4.

During the ongoing physician-patient relationship between

JONES and Defendants, JONES believed and BECKER testified that he
was the best qualified physician in the Salt Lake City, Utah, and
Intermountain areas to care for and treat JONES' inflammatory bowel
disease.

TR. at 1256 lines 2-5, 17-23, at 1259 lines 23-25, at
5

1260 lines 1-5, (testimony of Dr. Becker).
physician

in

the

Intermountain

area

BECKER was the only

performing

the

ileo-anal

surgical procedure on adults when JONES was operated on in 1984.
TR. at 1255a, lines 7-19; TR. at 1256, lines 24-25; TR. at 1257,
lines 1-2, 14-20; TR. at 1258, lines 1-13; TR. at 1259, lines 2325; TR. at 1260, lines 1-18, (testimony of Dr. Becker).
5.
risks

Prior to the surgical procedures, BECKER identified the

of

surgery

complications.

to

include

pelvic

infections

and

anesthesia

TR. at 1398 lines 5-21, at 1404 lines 18-25, at

1405 lines 1-7 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1494 lines 1013 (testimony of Marie Jones).

BECKER specifically represented to

JONES that there was no risk of impairment to his sexual function
and that the surgeries were performed in such a manner that it was
almost

surgically

impossible

from an anatomical

damage nerves that control JONES' sexual function.
lines

3-8, at

1405

lines

4-7

(testimony

standpoint

to

TR. at 1399

of G. Kevin

Jones);

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4; TR. at 1514 lines 14-19, at 1516 lines
15-17 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones).
6. Prior to the surgeries, BECKER refused to implement JONES'
request to store JONES' sperm.

Again, BECKER represented to JONES

there was no need to exercise this precaution because there was no
risk of injury to his sexual function from the surgeries or care.
TR. at 1399 lines 14-18, at 1400 lines 19-22, at 1405 lines 10-19
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1497, lines 13-19, 25; TR. at
1498, lines 1-6; 15-22; TR. at 1501, lines 16-17 (testimony of
Marie Jones); TR. at 1514 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Garth N.
6

Jones).

JONES had normal

sexual functions before

his

second

surgery.

TR. at 1402 lines 8-16 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR.

at 1229 lines 15-25, at 1230 lines 1-25, at 1231 lines 1-25, at
1232 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1499 lines 19-25,
at 1500 lines 1-12 (testimony of Marie Jones).
7.

JONES reported his awareness of his sexual dysfunction to

BECKER in April or May, 1984. TR. at 1410 lines 8-12 (testimony of
G. Kevin Jones).

BECKER repeatedly and consistently informed and

represented to JONES that his sexual disorders were in no way
related to the surgeries, that the surgical procedures had been
properly performed, that no damage to nerves had been sustained,
and that the surgeries were performed in such a manner that it was
almost anatomically impossible to damage nerves controlling his
sexual functions.

TR. at 1399 lines 3-8, at 1405 lines 4-7, at

1414 lines 7-10, 22-25, at 1415 lines 1-10, at 1416 lines 8-13, at
1417 lines 1-4, at 1445 lines 2-9 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones);
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4.

HOSPITAL and BECKER further advised

JONES that his sexual disorders were mental not physical and
recommended general psychotherapy. TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1417
lines 5-23, at 1419 lines 16-21, at 1420 lines 1-4, at 1421 lines
12-15, at 1424 lines 22-24 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones);

TR. at

1261 lines 9-17, at 1262 lines 8-22 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR.
at

1569

lines

1-3,

at

1575

lines

9-16,

at

1591

lines

7-10

(testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1677 lines 16-22 (testimony of
Dr. Segal); TR. at 1310 lines 6-19

(testimony of Dr. Hammond);

Defendants' Exhibit 6 (Dr. Hammond's findings); TR. at 1661 lines
7

6-12 (testimony of Dr. Middleton).
JONES was also told by Defendants that his sexual disorders
were temporary, and due to prolonged use of drugs for medical
treatment,

serious illness, trauma of surgery,

malnourishment,

fatigue, infrequent sex, and that in time his sexual functions
would return.

TR. 1322 lines 6-10, at 1323 lines 11-17, at 1333

lines 7-9, at 1414 lines 11-20, at 1417 lines 13-23, at 1421 lines
15-18, at 1466 lines 11-13 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at
1207 lines 15-25, at 1208 lines 1-2, at 1249 lines 11-20 (testimony
of

Dr. Becker);

TR. at

1657

lines

4-12, at

1662

lines

7-18

(testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1165 lines 15-20, at 1172
lines 17-25 (testimony of Dr. Dayton).
8.

In a telephone conversation initiated by JONES' father,

Dr. Garth N. Jones, in May, 1984, BECKER represented to Dr. Jones
that the operations could not have caused any sexual problems for
JONES.

That conversation was communicated by Dr. Jones to JONES.

TR. at 1516 lines 12-25, at 1517 lines 1-25, at 1518 lines 1-12
(testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones).

BECKER also assured JONES'

mother,

not

Marie

Jones,

that

JONES

suffering

any

sexual

dysfunctions experienced were not as a result of the surgeries.
TR. at 1502 lines 13-21 (testimony of Marie Jones).
9.

In addition to sexual dysfunction, since the surgery,

JONES has consistently suffered from recurrent prostatitis, urinary
infections, persistent diarrhea, frequent yeast infections and skin
irritations in the rectum; interrupted sleep, incontinence and
infections of the anal pouch. PL. at 677-20; TR. at 1632 lines 198

20, at 1633 lines 1-8 (testimony of Dr. Harman).
was

later

informed

in

1991

that

Defendant

Moreover, JONES

BECKER'S

original

diagnosis of ulcerative colitis was probably erroneous.

Instead,

JONES suffers from Crohns Disease, a disease that requires entirely
different surgical treatment than what JONES received from BECKER.
TR. at 1633 lines 8-15, at 1639 lines 13-24, at 1645 lines 11-25
(testimony of Dr. Harman); Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5.
10.

It was not until September 15, 1987, that JONES became

aware for the first time of the true nature of his injuries, the
cause and the possibility of negligence.

TR. at 1447 lines 18-25,

at 1448 lines 1-25, at 1449 lines 1-25, at 1450 lines 19-25, at
1451 lines 1-25, at 1452 lines 1-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
On this date JONES received medical examination and treatment from
Dr. Merril T. Dayton.
the

most

likely

At that time Dr. Dayton informed JONES that

cause

of

his

sexual

dysfunctions

was

that

"something went wrong during the surgeries to damage nerves."
at 1450 lines 12-16.
of G. Kevin Jones).

TR.

See also TR. at 1449 lines 18-21 (testimony
Prior to Dr. Dayton's statement on September

15, 1987, JONES had no reason to believe that the surgery performed
in

1984 may

have been

improperly

done and caused

his

sexual

dysfunction. TR. at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8 (testimony
of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1577 lines 13-21 (testimony of Terri
Stoker).

Dr. Dayton is an employee of HOSPITAL and the successor

surgeon to BECKER.

TR. 1130 at lines 13-25, at 1131 lines 1-10, at

1155 lines 11-19, at 1168 lines 6-15 (testimony of Dr. Dayton); TR.
at 1401 lines 23-25, at 1402 lines 1-4 (testimony of Dr. Becker).
9

Dr. Dayton was the first physician trained and experienced in the
ileo-anal procedure, a unique medical specialty in 1984, whom JONES
had seen, other than Dr. Becker, since undergoing surgery.

JONES'

treatment from Dr. Dayton was the first time JONES consulted with
a knowledgeable, independent physician about his medical condition.
TR. at 1398 lines 7-19, at 1399 lines 2-5, 17-25, at 1400 lines 12, 14-20, at 1401 lines 23-25, at 1402 lines 1-4, 23-25, at 1403
lines 1-5 (testimony of Dr. Becker).
11. JONES relied upon agents and employees of HOSPITAL during
the course of his continuing care and treatment with respect to his
condition.

TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1332 lines 11-17, at 1333

lines 7-9, at 1405 lines 19-21, at 1407 lines 4-25, at 1408 lines
1-25, at 1409 lines 1-3, at 1445 lines 20-23, at 1469 lines 5-8, at
1481 lines 7-15 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1519 lines
18-24 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones); TR. at 1497 lines 15-20,
at 1498 lines 20-25, at 1499 lines 1-2, at 1501 lines 11-13, at
1504 lines 1-2, 20-23 (testimony of Marie Jones); TR. at 1564 lines
20-25, at 1565 line 1, at 1569 lines 11-13 (testimony of Terri
Stoker).
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions
begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know that he has
sustained an injury, the injury's cause and that the injury is
attributable to negligence.

The District Court erred in ruling

that mere awareness of a temporary condition constitutes knowledge
of injury and begins the limitations period.
10

Knowledge of injury

sufficient to commence the limitations period occurs only when a
plaintiff has knowledge of the full nature, extent and permanency
of his injuries. Mere awareness of a physical condition alone does
not constitute notice of a legal injury for purposes of statutory
accrual.

Further, knowledge of injury cannot occur when a person

relies upon physicians representations that the condition is not an
injury but rather, is routine, temporary or non-existent. Further,
the District Court's ruling would encourage baseless claims merely
to stop the statute from running where a plaintiff posses knowledge
of injury absent knowledge of a causal link between the injury and
negligence.

Permitting

the

statute

to accrue

upon

the

mere

awareness of a medical condition would also reward health care
providers who withhold relevant information from a patient until
the statute has run.
represented

Therefore, in cases where the condition is

by the health care providers to be temporary

and

unrelated to medical treatment, the statute must be tolled until
the plaintiff knows that his condition is not merely temporary.
The requisite "knowledge of negligence" occurs only when a
plaintiff knows that he had suffered an "injury," its "cause" and
that it may have resulted from "negligence." The record reveals no
evidence which indicates that JONES was ever informed, prior to his
consultation with Dr. Dayton on September

15, 1987, that his

described and represented "temporary" dysfunction was permanent,
caused by the surgery and was the result of negligence.

In cases,

such as this case, where there are multiple potential causes of
injury,

the

statute

of

limitations must
11

be tolled

until

the

plaintiff becomes aware of the actual cause of his injury.
The continuous treatment doctrine recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court also tolls the running of the statute of limitations
until the termination of a course of treatment for the same or
related illnesses out of which the claim for malpractice arises.
The District Court held that the doctrine was inconsistent with
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4. However, other states which have similar
statutory limitations periods based on "discovery" still follow the
continuous treatment rule, citing Utah as authority. Furthermore,
the doctrine applies even if the plaintiff

is aware of the

negligence before the continuing period of treatment ends.
The unique facts of this case justify this Court to apply the
"exceptional circumstances" rule to toll the statute of limitations
until September 15, 1987, when JONES first learned of the permanent
nature of his dysfunction, its cause and possible negligence.
VII.
A.

1.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 5,
6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 AND 26 ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.

FACTS 5, 6, & 10. Findings of Fact numbered 5, 6, and 10

state that JONES and his parents were fully informed by BECKER
concerning the risks of the ileo-anal surgical procedure, including
the risk of sexual dysfunction as a result of the procedure. PL.
at 1084-85.

This factual finding is devoid of any basis in the

testimony or evidence presented at the trial.
contrary is true.

In fact, the

See supra Statement of Fact, 5.

The only

significant evidence presented indicates that BECKER specifically
12

rejected JONES' request to store his sperm in the event of problems
which

might

result

from

the

surgery.

Id.

BECKER

further

represented that sexual dysfunction was not one of the risks of the
procedure.

Statement of Fact, 5.

Moreover, the bifurcation of issues and trial was to address
the issue of what point in time JONES knew or should have known
that his sexual dysfunction was caused by the surgery and likely
resulted

from

negligence.

The

issue

of

informed

consent

is

irrelevant to a proper resolution of the statute of limitations
issue.

Accordingly, the Court's findings were clearly erroneous

and contrary to the overwhelming, contrary evidence, thus mandating
reversal and a new trial.
2. FACT 16.

Finding of Fact number 16 states that beginning

in May, 1984, JONES knew that his second surgery on February 27,
1984, was a possible cause of his sexual dysfunctions and that he
might have a cause of action against Defendants.

PL. at 1085.

This finding is also contrary to the only evidence offered on this
point.

See supra Statement of Facts, 7, 8, 10, and 11.

JONES

specifically denied any knowledge that his dysfunction was caused
by the operation of February 1984. At best JONES testified that he
reported the existence of dysfunction to BECKER in April or May of
1984.

He reported the dysfunction, not because he believed it was

caused by the surgery or negligence, but because he had a medical
problem and sought medical attention from his treating physician.
Further, his inquiry as to whether it was possible that the surgery
had caused his dysfunction was met with BECKER'S suggestion that
13

not only was it causally impossible but that there were a multitude
of other causes for his problem.

He was also told that

dysfunction was probably

and to let time pass, and

concentrate

on recovery

temporary

the

from his other health problems before

worrying about his sexual abilities.
3. FACT 17. Finding of Fact numbered 17 states that JONES did
not rely upon Defendants' opinion that his sexual dysfunctions were
caused by psychological factors.
clearly erroneous.
11.

PL. at 1085.

This finding is

See JONES' Statement of Facts numbered 7 and

To the contrary the only evidence presented to the Court was

that JONES followed the advise of BECKER and sought additional
treatment based on BECKER'S representation that the dysfunction was
psychological and temporary.
4. FACTS 18 & 19.

Findings of Fact numbered 18 and 19 state

that JONES was never misled in any manner concerning the possible
causes of his sexual dysfunction and that the Defendants did not
conceal any information relevant to JONES' condition. PL. at 1086.
However, even a brief review of the record indicates incontestably
that

BECKER

entirely

discounted

any

possibility

relationship between the surgery and his dysfunction.

of

a

causal

He was told

that his dysfunction was psychologicalf temporary, caused by his
general health at the time, and was more perceived than real. See
supra Statement of Facts, 5, 7, 8 and 10. There is no evidence in
the record which tends to show JONES was told or informed that the
surgery

could

dysfunction.

cause

or

did

cause

permanent,

serious

sexual

Defendants repeatedly denied any causation between
14

the surgery and the dysfunction, telling JONES the cause was to be
found elsewhere.

Absent any basis in the record, the finding is

clearly erroneous and the Court's decision must be reversed.
5. FACT 20.

Findings of Fact numbered 20 states that during

the years 1984 and
medical malpractice.

1985 JONES considered
PL. at 1086.

suing Defendants for

This finding is also clearly

erroneous and has no basis in the record.

The only testimony

introduced showed JONES rigorously denied that he contemplated
suing the University before his September 15, 1987 consultation
with

Dr. Dayton.

TR. at

1319

lines 3-5, at

1320 lines

5-7

(testimony of G. Kevin Jones). The record demonstrates that during
that particular time, JONES' disappointment was directed not at the
cause or blame for his dysfunction but at "the way in which [he]
was treated as an individual and as a patient" by Defendants.

TR.

at 1314a lines 20-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1634
lines

10-19,

at

1642

lines

8-15

(testimony

of

Dr.

Harman) .

Feelings of anxiety and disappointment do not replace the knowledge
of legal injury required to commence the statutory period under
Utah law.

The Court's finding was contrary to the overwhelming

evidence in the record and must be reversed for a new trial.
6. FACT 26.

Findings of Fact numbered 26 states that JONES'

action was not timely commenced within two years after JONES knew
of his sexual dysfunctions, and that he might have a claim for
malpractice.
erroneous.

PL. at 1086-87.

This conclusion of law is clearly

As will be shown below, there is no evidence in the

record that JONES knew or had reason to know he sustained a legal
15

injury as a result of the surgery performed until September 15,
1987.

See supra Statement of Facts, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11.

Court's

findings

to the contrary

as without

any

The

factual or

evidentiary basis and must be reversed.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE "KNOWLEDGE OF INJURY" AND "KNOWLEDGE
OF NEGLIGENCE" PRONGS OF THE FOIL TEST FOR "LEGAL INJURY"

In Utah, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
suits requires an action be brought "within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury. . . . "
Annotated, S 78-14-4.

Utah Code

In Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah

1979), the Utah Supreme Court explained that the statutory period
begins to run "when an injured person knows or should know that he
has suffered a legal injury." The Court interpreted the, "injury"
in Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 to mean "legal injury". Id.
Under Foil, and its progeny, "legal injury" is deemed to be
known when the plaintiff is aware of facts that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that "he has an sustained an injury
and that the injury was caused by negligent action." Foil, 601 P.2d
at 148; See Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v.
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696-97 (Utah 1980). Facts which give rise
to the requisite knowledge include; (1) the existence of an injury,
(2) awareness of its cause and (3) the possibility of negligence.
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah 1984); Exnicious
v. United States, 563 F.2d 418, 420 (10th Cir. 1977); C£. Foil, 601
16

P.2d at 146,
The record below clearly sets forth that JONES did not have
any

significant

information

which

would

have

caused

him

to

recognize his condition was a legal injury until at least September
15, 1987.

The detailed medical explanation made by Dr. Dayton to

JONES at this time provided JONES with the first knowledge that he
was actually injured.
the cause

of

his

It also provided the first indication that

injury may

have been

the

surgery

and

that

negligence during the operation was possible.
Despite this overwhelming evidence of lack of knowledge and
the absence of contrary evidence, the District Court found that the
statute of limitations had run because JONES "knew or should have
known that he had sustained an injury and the causation of the
same, on or about May of 1984."

PL. at 1046 (Court's Decision).

As the following will show, the District Court erred in improperly
determining that JONES was aware that he suffered a legal injury
prior to September 15, 1987. Plaintiff will show that the district
court erred by improperly applying the requirements of Foil to this
case.

Specifically, the court erred by failing to consider the

undisputed facts showing that JONES did not know he was injured
within the meaning of Foil, that JONES had no knowledge that his
injury was caused by the surgery and that JONES had no reason to
believe that the injury was the result of medical negligence before
September 15, 1987.
1.

The District
knowledge of
knowledge of
permanence of

Court erred. in failing to consider that
injury prong of the Foil test includes
the full nature, extent, severity and
the injury.
17

The first query in this case concerns the extent of JONES'
knowledge that he sustained an injury.

It must be determined

whether JONES had possession of facts necessary to satisfy the
"knowledge of injury" prong of the Foil test.
Supreme

Court

reasoned

that

"knowledge

of

In Foil, the Utah
injury"

required

a

plaintiff's understanding of the full nature, extent, severity and
permanency of his condition.

Foil, 601 P.2d at 147.

The Court

stated:
In the health care field it is typically
the case that there often is a great disparity
in the knowledge of those who provide health
care services and those who receive the
services
with
respect
to
expected
and
unexpected side effects of a given procedure,
as well as the nature, degree, and extent of
expected after effects. While the recipient
may be aware of a disability or dysfunction,
there may be, to the untutored understanding
of the average layman, no apparent connection
between the treatment provided by a physician
and the injury suffered. Even if there is, it
may be passed off as an unavoidable side
effect or a side effect that will pass with
time.
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147 (emphasis added); See also Christiansen v.
Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968).
The Court recognized patients are not in a position to know
whether

their

continued,

condition

"Indeed,

is normal

common

or

experience

an

injury.

teaches

that

The

Court

one

often

suffers from pain and other physical difficulties without knowing
or suspecting the true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe a
totally erroneous cause to the manifestations." Foil, 601 P.2d at
147.

Therefore, mere awareness of a condition or dysfunction in

18

isolation

does

not

constitute

knowledge

that

the

person

has

sustained an injury requisite to commence the limitations period.
In fact, knowledge of an injury, even permanent, severe injury,
cannot alone constitute "legal injury " in Utah.

As the Court in

Foil stated, "We hold that the term discovery of 'injury' in §7814-4 means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in
the injury" Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
Subsequent Appellate Court decisions, including this matter,
courts have ignored the Supreme Court's instruction and have held
that the requisite "knowledge" the plaintiff must have to satisfy
the Foil test is mere awareness of a temporary disorder, Reiser,
641 P.2d at 100; Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp. 781,
785 (D. Utah 1987); or the mere belief that a patient's symptoms
were

unavoidable

side effects

of treatment,

Flovd v. Western

Surgical Assoc, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
cases,

including

"knowledge

of

the

injury"

case
test,

at

bar,

have

undercutting

announced in Foil. Foil, 601 P.2d at 147-48;

misapplied
the

public

the

These
Foil

policies

See Reiser, 641 P.2d

at 102-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785
n.6; Mauahan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (10th
Cir. 1985).
Ruling that the first prong of the Foil test is satisfied by
mere awareness of present physical symptomology

or dysfunction

absent some indication of causation and negligence would "encourage
persons who experience minor or temporary injuries, dysfunctions,
19

or ailments to file lawsuits to prevent the statute of limitations
from running on the chance that the full extent of the ailment has
not been discovered."

Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785 n.6.

Such a

rule "is not consistent with the unarguably sound proposition that
unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged."
at 148.
Health

Foil, 601 P.2d

As noted in Foil, "One of the chief purposes of the Utah
Care

Malpractice

Act

was

to

prevent

the

filing

of

unjustified lawsuits against health care providers, with all the
attendant costs, economic and otherwise, that such suits entail."
Foil,

601 P.2d

at

148. See also Mauahan,

758 F.2d

at

1386.

Moreover, a plaintiff who merely files suit to prevent the statute
of limitations from running on the chance that the full extent of
the dysfunction would later be discovered would be susceptible to
dismissal on grounds of frivolity, Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1387, or
merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of nominal damages.5
Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Calif. 1975).
In addition, to hold that the first prong of Foil is satisfied
prior to the time a plaintiff becomes aware of the full extent and
5

Nominal damages are awarded to "vindicate a legal right"
where no actual loss has occurred. Dobbs, Remedies, §3.8 at 191
(1973); Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 784 n.4. Nominal damages cannot
be recovered in a negligence action because actual loss or damage
is an essential element for a cause of action in negligence.
Prosser, Torts, §30 at p. 143 (1971); Gaziia v. Nicholas J e m s Co.,
543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975). The mere threat of future harm,
not yet realized, will not support a negligence action. Prosser,
§30 at p. 143; Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th
Cir. 1977).
Thus, a right to recover nominal damages will not
commence the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case,
only the infliction of actual and appreciable damage will trigger
the running of the statute of limitations. See Gaziia, 543 P.2d at
341; Davies, 535 P.2d at 1168; Bridgford, 550 F.2d at 982.
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permanent

nature

of his

injuries would

encourage

health

care

providers having relevant information to delay disclosure until
after the statute has run.

Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785 n.6;

Mauqhan, 758 F.2d at 1386; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436.

The

District Court's decision in this case invites this type of delay
by ruling "that Dr. Becker did not acknowledge in 1984 or now that
JONES has a permanent sexual dysfunction problem caused by surgery,
is immaterial to the issue of JONES' knowledge."
(Court's Decision).

PL. at 1052

Such a ruling is inconsistent with Foil:

[i]t would also be imprudent to adopt a rule
that might tempt some health care providers to
fail to advise patients of mistakes that have
been made and even to make efforts to suppress
knowledge of such mistakes in the hope that
the running of the statute of limitations
would
make
a
valid
cause
of
action
nonactionable. . . . The law should foster a
fulfillment of the duty to disclose so that
proper remedial measures can be taken and
damage ameliorated.
Foil, 601 P.2d at 148.

These strong policy reasons militate in

favor of construing the first prong of the Foil test to require
knowledge of the injury for which recovery is sought, as well as
full appreciation of the nature, and extent of the injury.
This conclusion is supported by federal cases as well as the
Christiansen decision, which held that knowledge of alleged injury
requires the injury to manifest itself and be permanent.

In

Christiansen. the issue was whether the plaintiff could maintain an
action for injuries suffered due to alleged negligence in leaving
a broken surgical needle in the plaintiff some ten years after the
operation.

The plaintiff successfully argued that the statute did
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not accrue until the plaintiff discovered the existence of the
foreign object.

The Utah Supreme Court held that when a patient is

ignorant of his right of action, it did not accrue on the date of
the alleged negligence, but rather at the date he learned of the
foreign object
somewhat

in his body.

incongruous

that

The Court explained

an

injured

person

must

"[i]t

seems

commence

a

malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or reasonably should
have known, of his injury and right of action".
(emphasis added);

436 P.2d at 436

See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill,

120 n.7, 123-24 (1979); Williams v. Borden, 637 F.2d 731, 735 (10th
Cir. 1980); Wilson v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 843, 849 (M.D.
Ala. 1984); Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (E.D.
N.Y. 1983).
Furthermore,

knowledge

of

an

injury

is

negated

where

physicians make specific representations to the plaintiff that he
has no injury or that his condition is only temporary.
recognized

rule

that

"[p]atients

may

reasonably

It is a

rely

upon

assurances by physicians that complications are normal and do not
indicate that an actual injury has occurred."

Rosales v. United

States, 824 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1987); See McDonald v. United
States, 843 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250.
A patient
physician."

has a "right to place trust

and confidence

Otto v. National Institute of Health,

in his

815 F.2d 985,

988 (4th Cir. 1987); See Massev v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 252 (Nev.
1983).

The patient is "utterly dependent upon the skills and

ability of the physician, the patient should not be required to
22

second-guess his physician's prognosis."
249.

McDonald. 843 F.2d at

As the Court noted in Foil, " [i]n the health care field it is

typically the case that there often is a great disparity in the
knowledge of those who provide health care services and those who
receive the services."

Foil, 601 P.2d at 147.

requiring

scrutinize

patients

to

their

Moreover, a rule

doctors

diagnosis

prognosis would impose an unfair burden on the patient.

or

McDonald,

843 F.2d at 249. A patient's blameless ignorance of the existence
or cause

of

his

injury

should

not be held

against

him

and,

therefore, prevents the statute of limitations from running until
the plaintiff receives a correct diagnosis. Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163 (1949); Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436. See also Nicolazzo
v. United States, 786 F.2d 454, 456 (1st Cir. 1986); Barrett v.
United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1982); Jastremski v.
United States, 737 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1984).
The extent of JONES' knowledge of his injury (rather than a
general

awareness

suggests
suspicion

of his condition) and medical

no casual
regarding

connection

or otherwise

potential causes

of his

lays

advice
to

injury

which

rest
is

any

highly

relevant and critical to the determination of when a plaintiff
should be charged with notice of an injury.

Lee v. United States,

485 F. Supp. 883, 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d
1337, 1339 (Utah 1987); DuBose v. Kansas City Southern Railway, 729
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Wehrman v. United States. 830 F.2d 1480,
1484 (8th Cir. 1987); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222, 225 (2d
Cir. 1971); Bridqford, 550 F.2d at 982.
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When a physician informs

a patient that he has not sustained an injury; that no harm had in
fact occurred; that complications are temporary or not unusual
occurrences and will improve with time; the patient cannot be
charged with knowledge of injury and the statute of limitations is
not activated.

See Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Rosales, 824 F.2d at

804; Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 1986); Vacura v.
Plott, 666 F.2d

1200, 1204

(8th Cir. 1981); Burgess v. United

States, 744 F.2d 771, 772, 774 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984); Otto, 815 F.2d
at 989; Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1402-03; Toal, 438 F.2d at 225;
Cleveland v. Wong, 701 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Kan. 1985); Massev, 669
P.2d at 249. Massey is instructive on the knowledge of injury test
because in deciding what

"injury" means in Nevada's

statutory

discovery rule for malpractice, the court relied extensively upon
Foil.

See Massev, 669 P.2d at 251.
In this case JONES does not dispute that within weeks of being

released

from the University

Hospital

on April

16, 1984, for

treatment arising from his second surgery on February 27, 1984, he
began to experience sexual disability. However, the District Court
erred in ruling that mere awareness of his condition is all that is
necessary to trigger the limitations period.

JONES, argues that

although he was generally aware of a medical problem, he lacked any
appreciable knowledge of the nature and extent of his injuries.
JONES also held the belief, based on specific representations of
Defendants that the dysfunction was temporary in nature, did not
result from the surgery; was probably caused by other factors or
was non-existent.

JONES' total lack of medical knowledge and his
24

justified reliance on Defendants' representations of his condition
couple

to

show

the

Plaintiff

had

no

"knowledge

of

injury"

sufficient to satisfy the Foil test.
In the instant case, JONES did not know the full nature,
extent, severity, and permanency of his injuries until he was
advised of these facts by Dr. Merril Dayton on September 15, 1987.
Previous to this consultation, Defendants never indicated to JONES
that his sexual dysfunctions were related to their care or were
permanent.

Although following his release from the University

Hospital on April 16, 1984, JONES had expressed concerns about his
sexual functions, he was given reasonable and credible explanations
for the complications that ensued.
visits

to

University

Hospital

continually assured that:

The record discloses repeated
physicians

where

JONES

was

(1) no injury was present; and (2) that

his sexual dysfunctions were temporary and due to non-surgical
causes.
BECKER
defined".

characterized

JONES'

TR. at 1189 lines 9-10.

of Fact 115).
problem at all.

sexual

dysfunction

as

"ill-

See also PL. at 1085 (Findings

He was not sure if JONES had a sexual dysfunction
TR. at 1189 lines 14-23, at 1228 line 25, at 1229

lines 1-3, at 1235 lines 23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3.

Dr. Becker

stated "that the objective evaluation that [JONES'] had has been
equivocal in terms of clarifying what it is, or whether it exists."
TR.

at 1189 line 25, at 1190 lines 1-2.

(emphasis added).

See

also PL. at 1048 (Court's Decision).
Dr. Middleton, who JONES was referred to by BECKER "to sort
25

out" the sexual dysfunction question, TR. at 1234 lines

14-15

(testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1649 lines 10-11, at 1651 lines
15-22 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); explained to JONES "that it
would be unlikely that [he] would have a permanent disruption of
sexual function on the basis of the operations that had been done."
TR. at 1657 lines 1-2. See also TR. at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony
of Dr. Middleton) .
unusual

for

temporarily."

his

Upon inquiry, JONES was told that it was not

sexual

function

to be disrupted

by

"surgery

TR. at 1657 lines 9-11 (testimony of Dr. Middleton).

If there was disruption of some of the sympathetic

nerve

fibers that control ejaculation, JONES was informed that "it was
very likely not going to be a permanent or severe one, and that it
will improve with time."

TR. at 1661 lines 2-5 (testimony of Dr.

Middleton); See also TR. at 1660 lines 14-16 (testimony of Dr.
Middleton); TR. at 1236 lines 13-25, at 1237 lines 1-13 (testimony
of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1332 lines 10-17, at
1333 lines 7-9, at 1445 lines 8-9 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
Terri Stoker, employed by the University Hospital as a patient
advocate for BECKER'S post-surgical recovery team, confirmed that
BECKER informed JONES that if his sexual dysfunctions were related
to the surgery, the problem would resolve itself with time. TR. at
1569 lines 4-10; TR. at 1575 lines 10-16;

See also TR. at 1604

lines 16-19 (testimony of Dr. Mangelson).
BECKER had explained to JONES that two previous male patients
who

had

undergone

experienced

the

retrograde

same

surgeries

ejaculation
26

as

JONES,

complications,

subsequently
a

sexual

dysfunction where the sperm is ejaculated into the bladder rather
than out the penis, but this condition corrected itself over time.
TR. at 1655 lines 10-15 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1414
lines 5-7, at 1421 lines 19-22f at 1445 lines 10-11, at 1465 lines
17-22 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1236 lines 19-25, at
1237 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker). Dr. Middleton explained
to

JONES

that

if

the

sympathetic

nerve

fibers

that

control

ejaculation are disrupted the "sympathetic nerve fibers regenerate
and little ultimate harm is done."
1653 line 1; See TR. at

TR. at 1652 lines 23-25, at

1237 lines 18-25, at

1238 lines

1-6

(testimony of Dr. Becker).
Dr. Middleton opined JONES' prospects for future recovery were
good and that he should be patient and "that in time
ejaculation would return."

[JONES']

TR. at 1657 lines 11-12, at 1654 lines

8-9; See also TR. at 1658, lines 16-17; TR. at 1660 lines 3-4; TR.
at 1662 lines 7-9.

Dr. Middleton did not think that solving JONES'

sexual dysfunction problems were a "big priority" because restoring
"his fundamental health and well-being were much more important
than his ability to ejaculate."

TR. at 1658 lines 18-22, at 1663

lines 16-20. He recommended postponing further evaluation until a
later time when JONES was healthier.

TR. at 1662 lines 14-16.

JONES had faith in and relied upon the explanations provided
by University Hospital physicians that no injury was present, that
his sexual dysfunction problems were temporary, and that his sexual
function would return with time. See supra Statement of Facts, 11.
The advice and assurances provided to JONES by University
27

Hospital physicians was confirmed by physicians practicing outside
of

the

University

Hospital.

gastroenterologist,

Dr. Clifford

counseled

JONES

to

G.

Harman,

"table

the

JONES'

impotence

question" until JONES' health improved because it was not high on
the list of health priorities.

TR. at 1631 lines 18-22.

Dr.

Mangelson, like Dr. Middleton, is a urologist treating JONES but in
private practice.
that

given

function.

time

He concurred with Dr. Middleton's conclusion
there

would

be

a

recovery

of

JONES'

sexual

TR. at 1599 lines 22-25, at 1600 lines 1-2, at 1602

lines 14-17, at 1603 lines 6-25, at 1604 lines 1-2, at 1607 lines
4-6.

JONES consistently received hope and encouragement from his

treating physicians that with time there would be a recovery of his
sexual functions.

See TR. at 1602 lines 7-17, at 1603 lines 5-25,

at 1604 lines 1-2, at 1607 lines 4-9 (testimony of Dr. Mangelson);
TR. at 1657 lines 11-18, at 1658 lines 11-17, at 1660 lines 3-4,
13-16 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1239 line 7 (testimony
of Dr. Becker).
Since

a

patient

may

properly

rely

on

the

advice

and

representations of his treating physicians that an actual injury
has not occurred and that complications, if any, are not related to
surgery or are otherwise temporary, JONES had no reason to believe
at that time that he had sustained any injury.

See McDonald, 843

F.2d at 248; Raddatz, 750 F.2d at 796; Rosales, 824 F.2d at 804.
In this case, based on the evidence in the record, it is only
possible

to

conclude

that

it

was

not

until

after

JONES'

consultation with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987, that JONES
28

could

have

possibly

developed

knowledge

that

an

injury

had

occurred. Where a patient has been told that complications ctre not
permanent and "is told further that they can be treated, he cannot
be deemed to have knowledge of an injury.

In such circumstances,

he can only be deemed to have knowledge after a sufficient period
of time has passed
unsuccessful."

so as to alert him that the treatmemt

Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1403.

is

In this case it is

unnecessary to determine what constitutes a sufficient period of
time since it is entirely reasonable for JONES to have filed his
Notice within three months of his contact with Dr. Dayton,
JONES first became aware of the nature of injuries.

when

Therefore,

JONES' claim was timely because the assurances given to JONES by
his treating physicians precluded knowledge of injury prior to
September of 1987.6

interestingly and quite ironically, the District Court found
as a matter of fact that JONES had suffered no injury as a result
of the surgery.
In its decision, the court wrote:
" [I]n the
instant case there still appears to be a real fact question about
the nature and existence of any sexual dysfunctions and the csLUse."
PL. at 1048 (Court's Decision) (emphasis added).
The District
Court also characterized JONES' sexual dysfunctions as "ill
defined", PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 115), and "perceived". PL.
at 1085 (Findings of Fact 517), at 1086 (Findings of Fact * 1 18,
19, 20 and 26). It is interesting that neither the Court nor
Defendants doctors to this day agree on whether JONES has suffered
an injury.
To hold JONES to be aware that he has suffered an
injury, and then find as a matter of fact, that he has not is
plainly inconsistent and evidences the lower court's confusion
regarding proper application of Foil. This matter must be reversed
to permit trial under the proper legal guidelines.
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2.

The District Court erred, as a matter of law, in failing
to properly apply the knowledge of negligence prong of
the Foil test.

The

second prong

of the Foil

"knowledge of negligence".

legal

injury test

requires

Foil, 681 P.2d at 148. In Foil, the

Court held that the two year limitation period begins to run when
the plaintiff "knew or should have known that he had [l]sustained
an injury and [2] that the injury was [i] caused by [ii] negligent
action." Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 (emphasis added).

The second prong

of the Foil legal injury test includes two separate knowledge
elements; cause and negligence. A plaintiff must have knowledge of
both the cause of the injury and negligent action to satisfy the
second prong.
To satisfy the causation element, a plaintiff must know
that he has been injured and

"who has inflicted the injury."

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 122 (1979); Christiansen,
436 P.2d at 436; Foil 601 P.2d at 146-47.

The negligence element

requires that a plaintiff know that the injury was the result of
improper treatment.

Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d at 696;

Brower, 744 P.2d at 1338-39. In this case the cause and negligence
elements were

satisfied

for the first time only after JONES'

consultation with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987.
The first question, then, is whether JONES knew the cause of
his injuries before he received medical treatment from Dr. Dayton
on September 15, 1987. The difficulty in determining the cause of
JONES' injuries is amply demonstrated in the record.
discloses

repeated

visits

to

BECKER
30

and

The record

University

Hospital

physicians who specifically represented that the surgeries were not
the cause of his sexual disorders. TR. at 1235 lines 4-15, at 1238
lines 12-14 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 20-25, at
1654 lines 1-17, at 1657 lines 1-3, at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony
of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1414 lines 5-25, at 1415 lines 1-10, at
1416 lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417 lines 1-4, at 1421 lines 12-18
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4.

BECKER

also assured JONES' parents that there was "no sexual problems as
a consequence of this operation."

TR. at 1518 line 11-12.

See

also TR. at 1517 lines 20-23 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones); TR.
at 1502 lines 16-21 (testimony of Marie Jones).
BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that one of
the great benefits of the surgical procedure was that it was
performed in such a manner that there was no real risk to the
disruption of a patient's sexual functions.

TR. at 1398 line 25,

at 1399 lines 1-6, at 1414 lines 22-25, at 1415 lines 1-5, at 1416
lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417 lines 1-4 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones);
TR. at 1653 lines 12-19 (testimony of Dr. Middleton).

BECKER told

JONES that "it was anatomically almost impossible to disrupt this
system that would interfere with sexual functions."

TR. at 1399

lines 6-8 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1196 lines 19-25,
at 1197 lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker) .

In a letter to Dr.

Middleton, BECKER records a consultation with JONES about his
sexual functions as follows:
I spent a great deal of time talking about this problem
with him in my office this morning. I explained that no
true cases of impotence had been reported with the
mucosal proctectomy and ileoanal pull-through procedure.
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In fact, the operation is performed anatomically such
that
it
is
almost
impossible
to
damage
the
parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to totally destroy
the sympathetic innervation. I explained that we had had
one case of retrograde ejaculation that resolved
spontaneously. (emphasis added).
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4;

See also TR. at 1604 lines 5-15 (testimony

of Dr. Mangelson).
BECKER was so confident that the surgeries didn't cause JONES'
sexual problems that he didn't even think JONES had a sexual
dysfunction at all.

TR. at 1189 lines 21-25, at 1190 lines 1-2

(testimony of Dr. Becker).
BECKER

in

1987

entitled

In an article provided to JONES by
Ileal

Pouch-Anal

Anastomosis,

BECKER

describes his surgical experience with a large series of patients
at the University of Utah Medical Center.
at 1458 lines 1-14
Exhibit 5.

TR. at 1457 lines 3-25,

(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); Plaintiff's

The aim of the study was to assess the operative

outcome, including sexual function, in 100 consecutive patients who
underwent ileal pouch-anal anastomosis. JONES was included in this
study as patient no. 33.

TR. at 1187 line 14 (testimony of Dr.

Becker); TR. at 1458 lines 6-7 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

The

study records the only sexual disorders in males as retrograde
ejaculation

in two male patients with

no impotence

observed.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 at 378, 383. JONES was not identified as one
of the male patients suffering retrograde ejaculation. TR. at 1414
lines 5-7, at 1419 lines 12-14, at 1421 lines 19-22, at 1445 lines
10-11 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

Thus, as of the date of this

article, October, 1986, BECKER had not even identified JONES as one
of his patients suffering from sexual disorders as a result of his
32

surgeries.

TR. at 1458 lines 3-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that his
sexual problems were due to a variety of factors that were not
associated with the surgeries or their care.

TR. at 1414 lines 7-

10, at 1421 lines 12-18 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

They even

told JONES that his sexual problems were mental not physical and
recommended general psychotherapy.
7.

See supra Statement of Facts,

Outside evaluations also concluded that JONES' sexual problems

were psychological.

TR. at 1685 lines 5-6

Jaspen); and TR. at 1539 lines 8-14

(testimony of Dr.

(testimony of Dr. Smith).

Other possible causes of JONES' sexual disorders were identified by
University physicians as prolonged use of medications, serious
illness, trauma of major surgery, malnourishment, infrequent sexual
activity, lack of a sex partner, and fatigue. See supra JONES'
Statement of Facts No. 7.
The record demonstrates that BECKER really didn't know whether
JONES'

sexual

surgery."

dysfunctions

were

"in

any

way

related

to

the

TR. at 1235 lines 14-16; See also TR. at 1189 lines 14-

20; TR. at 1228 line 25; TR. at 1229 lines 1-3 (testimony of Dr.
Becker) . When asked his opinion as to what was the cause of JONES'
sexual dysfunction, BECKER replied:

"I'm not sure.

Based on all

the tests and what has happened . . . and the number of people who
have seen [JONES] and consulted on the problem, I think it's still
very unclear."

TR. at 1235 lines 23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3.

Even

the District Court found that "in the instant case there still
appears to be a real fact question about the nature and existence
33

of any sexual dysfunctions and the cause."

PL. at 1048 (Court's

Decision) (emphasis added). See also PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact
H 15)("Since April or May, 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined
sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively
determined.")(emphasis added).
It was unreasonable for the District Court to hold JONES to a
higher degree of medical competence and understanding of the cause
of his condition than the many medical experts he consulted.

See

Reis v. Cox, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982); Harrison v. United
States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 (1983).

"Ordinarily, a plaintiff

cannot be expected to discover the general medical cause of his
injury even before the doctors themselves are able to do so."
Rosales, 824 F.2d at 805; Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350,
1353 (11th Cir. 1988).

As stated in Foil:

Indeed, common experience teaches that one
often suffers pain and other physical
difficulties without knowing or suspecting the
true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe
a
totally
erroneous
cause
to
the
manifestations. Even those who are trained in
medical science often require the additional
expertise of one possessing specialty training
to diagnose properly the cause of certain
ailments.
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147.
The fact that JONES had suspicions about the cause of his
injuries are not enough to have the statute run in favor of the
Defendants. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 345 (D. Utah
1984) (w[a] finding of reasonable suspicion on the part of the
plaintiff was insufficient to initiate the running of the statutory
period. Actual knowledge of facts material to his federal cause of
34

action was required."); Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604 (10th
Cir. 1983).

Similarly, a "layman's subjective belief" regardless

of its sincerity or ultimate vindication, "in a cause does not
start the statute when a competent medical professional would
disagree with the belief." Nemmers v. United States, 795 F.2d 628,
631 (7th Cir. 1986); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269
(7th Cir. 1980); Gould v. United States, 684 F. Supp. 508 (N.D.
111. 1988).

Plaintiffs who seek to understand the cause of an

injury may reasonably rely upon advice and assurances by doctors.
Brower, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Chamness. 835
F.2d at 1353; McDonald, 843 F.2d at 248.

In this case JONES

believed he was competently advised that the surgery did not cause
his injuries and therefore should not be punished for refusing to
press a claim that was apparently baseless at that time.

Nemmers,

795 F.2d at 632.
The best medical advice available prior to September 15, 1987
did not establish the cause of JONES' condition.

JONES' suspicion

or belief that his problems dated from the second

surgery on

February 27, 1984, was merely one of series of explanations that he
seized upon in anguish and desperation to explain his difficulties.
JONES was influenced by Defendants' conclusion that his problems
were psychological, TR. at 1469 lines 5-8, at 1481 lines 7-15
(testimony

of

G.

Kevin

Jones),

and

psychiatrist to determine the cause.

was

willing

to

see

a

TR. at 1564 lines 20-25, at

1565 line 1 (testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1633 line 19
(testimony of Dr. Harman).

During this time, JONES unsuccessfully
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searched for the cause of his problems.

TR. at 1577 lines 13-21

(testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1634 lines 19-21 (testimony of
Dr. Harman). None of JONES' privately conceived notions regarding
the

possible

cause

of his condition

became

knowledge

until

September 15, 1987 when he was examined by Dr. Dayton. TR. at 1450
lines 19-25, at 1451 lines 1-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Dr.
Dayton

diagnosed

the

most

likely

cause

of

JONES'

dysfunctions as disruption to nerves during surgery.

sexual

TR. at 1449

lines 18-21, at 1450 lines 12-16 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
Dr. Dayton's explanation provided JONES with the

first real

indication of the cause of his disabilities. TR. at 1450 lines 1925, at 1451 lines 1-5 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Only then did
JONES know that his difficulties were caused by the surgical
procedures.

See Harrison, 708 F.2d at 1028.

To adopt a rule, such as the District Court did in the instant
case, that encourages the filing of lawsuits when a plaintiff
develops a disorder but has no knowledge of its cause, or which of
several possible causes it may be, is inconsistent with the policy
that discourages baseless claims, and would needlessly add to an
already crowded docket.

Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Mauahan, 758 F.2d

at 1386. Moreover, to adopt a rule that the statute begins to run
as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that a number of different
sources are suspected to be the cause of his difficulties would be
absurd.

It would force a plaintiff to file suit against all

suspected causes simply to prevent the statute from running as to
any of them. A plaintiff who did so would be subject to dismissal
36
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Dear Clerk,
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellant G. Kevin Jones, hereby notifies the Clerk of
the Utah Court of Appeals of pertinent and significant
supplemental authority that has come to the attention of
Appellant since the Briefs herein were filed. This authority was
discovered while counsel was preparing for oral argument in this
matter currently set for March 22, 1993.
The supplemental authority of Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763
P.2d 817, 819, n.l. (Utah App. 1988), recognizes the continued
application of the "Continuing Treatment Doctrine" to toll the
statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases until medical
treatment with the negligent physician ends. Chadwick recognizes
the continued validity of the doctrine after passage of U.C.A.
§78-14-4 (1953), as amended, which became effective July 1, 1976.
The references to Chadwick should be added to the
Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as follows:
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1.

At page two (2), insert, "and cited by the Utah Court
of Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 819,
n.l (Utah App. 1988).", after the citation "Peteler
v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)."

2.

At page forty-five (45), insert, "and cited by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817,
819, n.l (Utah App. 1988).", after the citation
"Peteler v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)."

3.

At page forty-six (46)insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at
819, n.l." after the statement, "Thus, these cases
reflect the continued recognition of the continuing
treatment doctrine in Utah jurisprudence,".

4.

At page forty-nine (49) insert, "Chadwick,763 P«2d at
819, n.l.", after the citation "Metzger, 709 P.2d at
417."

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
1.

At page one (1) insert "and cited by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen/ 763 P.2d 817, 819, n.l
(Utah App. 1988).", after the citation "Peteler
v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)."

2.

At page thirteen (13) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at
819, n.l." after the statement, "Absent evidence of
intent to abrogate the precedent of Peteler, the
enactment of section 78-14-4 should be read as being
consistent."

3.

At page eighteen (18) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at
819, n.l.", after the statement "Based on these sound
principles, this Court should recognize the continuing
treatment doctrine as a valuable and viable exception
to section 78-14-4."

4.

At page thirteen (21) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at
819, n.l.", after the statement, "Accordingly, this
Court should uphold the continuing treatment doctrine
as a consistent exception to section 78-14-4."
Respectfully Submitted,

JRT F . ORTON, ESQ.
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cc:
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William T. Evans, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he/she served a copy
of the foregoing U.R.A.P 24(j) Notice of Supplemental Authority
upon the following persons, by first class mail, postage prepaid
thereon, this 8th day of February, 1993:
David G. Williams, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. 45000
Slatl Lake City, Utah 84145

William T. Evans, Assitant Attorney General
Attoenry General's Office
36 So. State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

An Employee oj Marsden, Orton Cahoon &
Gottfredson

on grounds of frivolity.

See Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1387.

In cases involving suspected multiple causes such as this one,
the statute must be tolled until the plaintiff knows the particular
factor that was "the" cause of the injury.

The legal injury test

requires knowledge of "the" cause of the injury, not "a" cause as
determined by the District Court.
116).

To know the cause a plaintiff must know "who has inflicted

the injury."
436;

PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact

Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at

See Foil, 601 P.2d at 146-47; Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155

(patient must know the existence of an injury and "its" cause);
Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1385-87 ; Exnicious, 563 F.2d at 420 n.7 ("[A]
person may be quite aware of damages but may be unable to learn the
cause of his condition and hence, whether it is related to earlier
medical treatment").
The list of suspected causes of JONES7 sexual dysfunction was
seemingly

endless.

There were many

suspected

causes

of

the

difficulties, none of which gave rise to a legal cause of ciction.
In addition, although JONES attempted to determine the cause of his
difficulties, he was confronted with complex, controversial, and
rapidly changing medical data and opinions.

Lacking the expert

knowledge necessary to affix causation, JONES relied upon the
Defendants' assurance that JONES had not been injured by the
surgeries.

See

supra

Statement

of

Facts,

11.

Under

these

circumstances, JONES was unable to determine the cause of his
injuries until after his consultation with Dr. Dayton in September
of 1987.

See supra Statement of Facts, 10.
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The second question in examining the knowledge of negligence
prong is whether JONES was aware, along with the knowledge of
causation, that the injury may have been caused by negligence. In
Foil, as in the instant case, the plaintiff believed that he
suffered a physical injury and suspected that the injury may have
been related to medical treatment.

However, in neither Foil nor

this case was there an obvious reason to suppose that the injury
was attributable to negligence.
incompletely

found

that

In this case the District Court

JONES' cause

of

action

against

the

Defendants had run because the "plaintiff discovered the 'injury'
and made the casual connection between the problem and the surgery
in April or May of 1984."

PL. at 1047 (Court's Decision).

Why

JONES should have known at that time that his injuries were
possibly the result of negligence is simply not explained by the
District Court nor is it explicable from the record. Moreover, the
burden of proof was on the Defendant to show JONES knew or had
reason to know that negligence may have occurred during the
operation.

TR. at 1128 lines 14-19 (statement of the Court).

The record discloses repeated visits to BECKER and HOSPITAL
physicians who consistently told JONES that there was nothing wrong
with the surgeries. TR. at 1415 lines 6-7, at 1417 lines 5-23, at
1421 lines 12-17, at 1445 lines 6-8 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones);
TR. at 1228 lines 10-12, at 1235 lines 4-10 (testimony of Dr.
Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 20-25, at 1654 lines 1-3 (testimony of
Dr. Middleton). BECKER stated that there were no complications in
any of the three surgical procedures he performed on JONES in 1984.
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TR. at 1214 lines 22-25, at 1215 lines 1-21, at 1220 lines 11-17,
at 1227 lines 20-25, at 1228 lines 7-12 (testimony of Dr. Becker).
BECKER described the second surgical procedure of February 27,
1984, the procedure that JONES and Dr. Dayton suspect may have been
the cause of his injuries, as going "very smoothly."

See also

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 ("The surgery went without difficulty").
TR.

at

1220

lines

11-15

(testimony

of

Dr. Becker).

BECKER

experienced "no problems" during this procedure. TR. at 1220 lines
15-17 (testimony of Dr. Becker).
nerve distribution.

JONES had no abnormal anatomy or

TR. at 1215 lines 13-15 (testimony of Dr.

Becker); See also TR. at 1415 lines 6-8

(testimony of G. Kevin

Jones)•
BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that "the
operation

is

performed

anatomically

such

that

it

is

almost

impossible to damage the parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to
totally destroy the sympathetic innervation."
No. 4.(emphasis added);

Plaintiff's Exhibit

See also TR. at 1196 lines 13-25, at 1197

lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 12-25, at
1654 lines 1-2, 16-17 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1399
lines 3-8, at 1415 lines 1-25, at 1416 lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417
lines

1-4, at

1445 lines

3-6

(testimony

of G. Kevin

Jones).

According to BECKER the procedures are performed in such a manner
that the nerves which control sexual function are not vulnerable at
any stage of the process.

TR. at 1196 lines 13-17, at 1197 lines

15-17 (testimony of Dr. Becker).

BECKER never said anything to

JONES from which JONES could have implied that BECKER was negligent
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in performing the surgery.

TR. at 1235 lines 4-10, at 1238 lines

12-15 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1590 lines 15-21 (testimony
of Terri Stoker).

JONES eventually was referred to other doctors

about his condition,, none of whom ever suggested that the cause of
his sexual dysfunction was attributable to the negligent surgery or
care provided by Defendants.

All of the other doctors told JONES

that the surgery was properly performed.

TR. at 1594 lines 14-21

(testimony of Dr. Mcingelson); TR. at 1639 line 25, at 1640 lines 12 (testimony of Dr. Harman).
It is undisputed that shortly after discovering his symptoms,
JONES investigated their potential cause and received a credible
explanation negating injury, causation and negligence.

Where a

claimant is provided with a credible explanation of his problems
not indicating malpractice, he may not be found to have failed to
exercise reasonable diligence because he did not earlier pursue his
claim.

Brgwer, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Jordan

v. United States, 503 F.2d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1974); Exnicious, 563
F.2d at 421; Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 n.3; Bridqford, 550 F.2d at 98182.

As the Seventh Circuit observed in Nemmers, "the statute of

limitations should not be construed to compel everyone who knows of
an injury to scour his medical records just in case the . . .
physician did something wrong."

Nemmers. 795 F.2d at 631.

The record reveals no evidence which indicates that JONES ever
witnessed anything prior to his consultation with Dr. Dayton on
September 15, 1987, which should have led him to believe he was the
victim of malpractice.

TR. at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8
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(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); See also TR. at 1577 lines 13-21
(testimony of Terri Stoker).

At this consultation Dr. Dayton told

JONES that the most likely was that "something went wrong during
the surgeries" to damage nerves. TR. at 1450 lines 12-16; see also
TR. at 1449 lines 18-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

Prior to

Dr. Dayton's statement on September 15, 1987, there is nothing in
the record which would give JONES any reason to believe that the
act performed during the February 27, 1984 surgery, which probably
caused his impaired sexual function, may have been improperly done
and whether or not it conformed to accepted medical practice.

TR.

at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8, 12-21 (testimony of G.
Kevin

Jones).

It

was

only

after

the

September

15,

1987

consultation with Dr. Dayton that Plaintiff first believed that his
sexual problems may have been caused by medical malpractice and
that he may have a cause of action against Defendants. See also TR.
at

1577, lines

1-8,

12-21.

See

also

TR.

1577

lines

13-21

(testimony of Terri Stoker).
The myriad medical experts JONES consulted could not express
a reasoned opinion that the cause of JONES' sexual impairment was
probably

an error in the medical procedures conducted

University Hospital.

at the

JONES cannot be attributed with sufficient

knowledge as a result of the medical evaluations and opinions to
satisfy

the

knowledge

September 15, 1987.
1026,

1028.

information

It
which

of

negligence

prong

of

Foil

prior

to

Reis, 660 P.2d at 50; Harrison, 708 F.2d at

is

only

when

reasonably

JONES

indicated
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had
that

gleaned

sufficient

something

in

the

performance of or related to the medical treatment that caused the
injury was

improper

that the knowledge

of negligence

satisfied, Cf. Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d

test

is

at 696;

Harqett, 598 F. Supp. at 154; grower, 744 P.2d at 1338-39; See also
Jones v. Salem Hospital, 762 P.2d 303, 313 (Or. App. 1988); Niblack
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Colo. 1977); Exnicious,
563 F.2d at 420 n«6; Jordan, 503 F.2d at 621.

(During an eye

examination, plaintiff was told "by the examining doctor that such
visits were no longer necessary as there was nothing more they
could do for the eye, and that it was 'too bad they screwed up your
eye when they operated on your nose.'").
Simple

awareness

of

an

injury

that

might

have

been

an

unavoidable consequence of the medical treatment, or the result of
some other cause, or even a temporary side effect of treatment does
not mean that the patient had knowledge that the injury was the
result of improper treatment.

Foil, 601 P.2d at 147; Reiser, 641

P.2d at 103 (Stewart, J., dissenting);

See also Exnicious, 563

F.2d at 419 n.6 (a patient "may be aware of his injury and perhaps
connect it with prior medical treatment but may be totally ignorant
as to what occurred during his treatment and whether or not it
conformed to accepted medical practice."); Bridgford, 550 F.2d 982;
Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1402; Cleveland, 701 P.2d at 1306.

(While

the plaintiff knew that he was impotent immediately after surgery
he had no reason to suspect that the condition was the result of
any negligence by defendant).

Similarly, the discovery of injury

does not necessarily lead to the discovery of possible negligence.
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Imes v. Touma, 784 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 1986).

A patient does

not have a cause of action against a physician simply because a
surgical procedure
have.'"

"does

'not turn out as it was supposed

to

DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d at 276, 280 (7th Cir.

1979).
Numerous

cases

stress

that

in

a

plaintiff's

effort

to

understand whether an injury was the result of malpractice, he may
reasonably rely upon advice and assurances by doctors that no
negligence is present,

grower, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d

at 250; Chairiness, 835 F.2d at 1353; McDonald, 843 F.2d at 248;
Massey, 669 P.2d at 252; Toal, 438 F.2d at 225; Raddatz, 750 F.2d
at 793, 796; Short v. Downs. 537 P.2d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 1975).
JONES and his parents did in fact rely upon Defendants' statements
that nothing went wrong in the surgeries.

See supra Statement of

Facts, 11.
In this case, at best, the District Court found that JONES
discovered only a "cause" of his injuries.
Decision).

PL. at 1046 (Court's

It did not find or conclude that JONES knew or should

have known that the cause of his injuries may have been due to
negligence by Defendants.

PL. at 1047 (Court's Decision).

The

District Court's decision erroneously interpreted Foil to mean that
the statute runs from two years when a plaintiff knew or should
have known that he had suffered an injury which may hav€» been
caused by Defendants.

However, Foil requires that the plaintiff

know or should have known that his injuries may have been "caused"
by "negligence" of the defendant. 601 P.2d at 148; See also Hove,
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621 P.2d at 696; Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154; Brower, 744 P.2d at
1338-39.
The District Court's error in interpreting and applying the
knowledge

of

negligence

prong

of

the

Foil

test

is

further

demonstrated from the court's own statement that it thought the
trial dealt with "liability", TR. at 1436 lines 22-23, when the
issue before the court was the statute of limitations. TR. at 1436
lines 17-21, 24-25 (statement of Mr. Orton); TR. at 1437 lines 1-2
(statement of Mr. Williams).

A court that is unaware of the issue

being tried before it cannot apply the proper legal standard.
In

the

instant

case,

the

District

Court

erred

in

its

interpretation and application of the knowledge of negligence prong
by

barring

JONES' claim

prior

to

the

time

when

he

had

any

reasonable cause to believe that the acts which caused his injury
were wrongful.

See Jordan, 503 F.2d at 624. As this Court stated

in Foil, "when injuries are suffered that have been caused by an
unknown act of negligence by an expert, the law ought not to be
construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes
aware of the existcmce of that right."
C.

601 P.2d at 147.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTINUING TREATMENT DOCTRINE IS NOT
APPLICABLE SINCE THE LEGISLATURE PASSED S78-14-4, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.

In the instant case the District Court held "the continuing
treatment

doctrine" was inconsistent with the Utah statute of

limitations for medical malpractice as codified in §78-14-4 and
rejected

its application in this case.

PL. at

Decision); PL. at 1088 (Conclusions of Law 56-7).
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1052

(Court's

The continuing

treatment doctrine was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Peteler
v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932).

The

doctrine tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the
termination of the course of treatment for the same or related
illnesses*

Peteler. 17 P.2d at 250.

The District Court did not explain the rationale for its
rejection of this precedent.

Since the Peteler decision in 1932,

Utah has consistently been recognized as a state adopting the view
that the limitation period does not begin to run until termination
of treatment.

See 144 A.L.R. at 227-28 (1943); 80 A.L.R.2d at 380-

81 (1961); Ballenqer v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 287, 294 (N.C. 1978)
(citing Peteler); Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845, 849 n.6 (Colo.
1987)(citing Peteler).

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has cited

Peteler in a decision that post dates the enactment of §78-14-4.
In Hooper Water Improvement, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
Utah's

statutes of limitations and stated that

"recognized

an

exception

in medical

in Peteler it

malpractice

cases, which

exception is very similar to the 'continuous services exception'
urged by the plaintiff in this action."

642 P.2d at 747 (Howe, J.,

concurring); See e.g. Hooper Water Improvement v. Reeve, 642 P.2d
745, 747
Children's

(Utah 1982)(Howe, J., concurring); Chapman v. Primary
Hospital,

784

P.2d

1181,

1186

(Utah

1989)(citing

Peteler). Moreover, in Foil the Court cited Hundley v. St. Francis
Hospital,

327

P.2d

131,

135

(Cal.

1958)

in

support

of

its

interpretation of §78-14-4. See Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. In Hundley
the California Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
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in medical malpractice cases does not commence to run while the
physician-patient relationship continues.
135.

Hundley, 327 P.2d at

Thusf these cases reflect the continued recognition of the

continuing treatment doctrine in Utah jurisprudence.

Finally,

other states which have discovery type limitations periods similar
to Utah recognize the continuous treatment rule.

See Mills v.

Garlow. 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989); Metzaer v. Kalke. 709 P.2d
414, 416-17 (Wyo. 1985).

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
REJECTING THE CONTINUING TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNTIL JONES/ TREATMENT BY THE
DEFENDANT WAS CONCLUDED.

Courts which have addressed the issue uniformly hold that when
there has been a course of continuous medical treatment the running
of the statute of limitations against medical malpractice actions
starts at the end of the treatment if the treatment has been for
the same or related injury or complaint out of which the claims for
malpractice arose.

See, 144 A.L.R. 209, 227 (1943); 80 A.L.R.2d

368, 379 (1961); Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y.
1962); Farley v. Goode, 252 S.E.2d 594

(Va. 1979); Johnson v.

Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d
77

(Minn. 1971); Williams v. Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1941);

Metzqer, 709 P.2d at 414, 416-17; Otto, 815 F.2d at 985; Comment,
The Continuous Treatment

Doctrine:

A Toll on the Statute of

Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 Albany L. Rev.
64 (1984) (hereinafter Comment); Stallings v. Gunter, 394 S.E.2d
212 (N.C. App. 1990).
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Treatment

consists

not

only

of

treating

the

original

condition, but also all subsequent care and treatment essential to
full recovery.

Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hospitals &

Clinics, 411 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. App. 1987).

The subsequent

treatment may consist of an "affirmative act or an omission" which
is related to the original cause of action.
at 216, Comment, at p. 76-77.

Stallinqs, 394 S.E.2d

Subsequent treatment can even occur

when the physician takes no affirmative action during a patient's
office visit or when the patient initiates the office visit "to
complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the
initial treatment."

McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1111

(N.Y. 1982); Comment, at p. 79.

This treatment by omission may

occur "[i]f a patient continues under post-operative observation by
his physician and is advised that his condition is being cured."
Fonda v. Paulsen, 363 N.Y.S.2nd, 841, 844 (N.Y. 1975).

Under these

conditions "this is as much 'treatment' as affirmative acts such as
surgery, therapy, or prescription of medicines. . . [because] there
would be little chance for legal redress by a patient who has been
the victim of an alleged malpractice who is advised that time is
the only barrier to a complete cure, when in reality time is a
barrier to a cause of action."

Fonda, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 844. Thus,

telephone

evidence

consultations

are

attending and treating the patient.

that

the

physician

is

Grondahl v. Bullock, 318

N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Giles v. Sanford Memorial Hospital &
Nursing Home, 371 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. App. 1985).
It is not necessary under the continuous treatment doctrine
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that the subsequent treatment itself be negligent.

Holdridge v.

Heyer - Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1098
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Stallinas, 394 S.E.2d at 215; Comment at 77 n.51.
The rule of decision in continuing treatment cases is that if the
patient was treated for the same or related ailments over a
continuous course, then the plaintiff could wait until the end of
that treatment to complain of any negligence which occurred during
that treatment. Grubbs v. Rawls, 369 S.E. 2d 683, 687 (Va. 1988).
Thus, under the continuing treatment doctrine, a plaintiff's cause
of action does not accrue until the continuing treatment ends,
"even

if

the

plaintiff

is aware

of

the

facts

constituting

negligence before that time." Wehrman, 830 F.2d at 1483; LaBav v.
White Plains Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (1983); Kelly v.
United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 2983).

Finally,

courts have declined to limit the application of the continuing
treatment doctrine to a specific number of years.
Natvia,

381

S.E.2d

8,

10

(Va.

1989)(patient

saw

Justice v.
defendant

physicians over an eight year period).
The record establishes that JONES' attending physician, Dr.
Becker, continued to treat JONES for the same medical condition
from 1984 until he left his position at the University Hospital in
January, 1987, and referred him to Dr. Dayton.

TR. at 1430 lines

12-20, at 1432 lines 13-21, at 1446 lines 20-24 (testimony of G.
Kevin Jones); TR. at 1180 lines 10-15, 20-25, at 1181 line 1, at
1258 lines 23-25, at 1259 lines 1-4 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR.
at 1167 lines 20-25, at 1168 lines 1-7 (testimony of Dr. Dayton).
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On December 5, 1986, Dr. Becker ordered a pelvic CT scan of JONES
to evaluate him for abscesses, and also discussed with JONES the
results of the CT scan.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17; TR. at 1260

line 25, at 1261 lines 1-6 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1430
lines 21-25, at 1431 lines 1-25; at 1432 lines 1-22; at 1444 lines
18-24

(testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

Moreover, the Defendants

stipulated that their medical treatment of JONES related to the
operations

and

extended

until

Hospital in January, 1987.

Dr. Becker

left

the

University

TR. at 1440 lines 23-25, at 1441 line

1 (statement of Mr. Williams).

See also TR. at 1410 lines 3-7

(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1263 lines 24-25, at 1264
lines 1-12, 19-21 (testimony of Dr. Becker).
Accordingly, the limitation period established by Utah Code
Annotated

78-14-4 began to run with respect to JONES' claims

against Dr. Becker and the University Hospital in January, 1987, or
at the earliest

late December,

1986.

While the CT scan was

performed on December 5, 1987, it was sometime thereafter that Dr.
Becker notified JONES of the results.

TR. at 1432 lines 1-12, at

1444 lines 21-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

Therefore, JONES

had until January, 1989, or at the earliest, late December, 1988,
to file his Complaint.

Since JONES filed his Notice of Intent to

Commence Action on December

4, 1987, he has filed within the

statutory period and this action is timely pursuant to Peteler.
Plaintiff's

Exhibit

No.

1; See Callahan,

Metzger, 709 P.2d at 417.
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365

S.E.2d

at

719;

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing has demonstrated that the District Court erred
in its application of Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-4 to the facts of the
present

case.

The Court made erroneous conclusions

of

fact,

unsupported by any evidence in the record. Further the lower court
improperly applied Foil to the case.
Specifically, the court erred in finding that JONES was aware
he had sustained an injury when the Doctors, and even the Court
later found as a matter of fact no injury occurred.

The Court

further erred by failing to find factual or legal support for its
holding that Plaintiff knew of the cause of his injury.

Finally,

the Court erred in completely omitting requisite findings regarding
knowledge of potential negligence.
Because the Court erred in its applications of the law in
this case, reversal of the lower court's decision and a new trial
is warranted.

Affirmance of the District Court's decision would

perpetrate an injustice because it would reward Defendants for
delaying disclosure of the true nature of JONES' injuries until
after the statute of limitations had run, leaving JONES without a
legal remedy.
Respectfully submitted this^?6Z<kday of August, 1992.

'ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483
MARSDEN,
ORTON,
CAHOON
GOTTFREDSON
ATTORNEYS FOR JONES/
APPELLANT, G. KEVIN JONES
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.
BRADLEY R HELSTEN, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law firm of MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON, Attorneys
for Plaintiffs herein: that she served the attached BRIEF of
APPELLANT upon the parties listed below by placing true and correct
copies thereof in envelopes addressed to the following and causing
the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the, LSD
day of AUGUST, 1992.
William T. Evans, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant, State of Utah
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David G. Williams, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENASEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants,
The University of Utah
The University of Utah Hospital and
Medical Center
James M. Becker, M.D.
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Clerk of the Utah
Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 S. 5th E.
Salt Lake City, Ut
84102

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1992.

1 ^ ^ 2 2 * 1 ^ West I
lX vngrw

W g M M S r

Notary Public
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78-14-3

JUDICIAL CODE

professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated, and to provide
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims
if*
78-14-3. Definitions.
AB used m this a d
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to
practice audiology under Chapter 41, Title 68,
Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person
licensed to practice as a certified social worker as
provided in Section 58-35-5
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under Sections
58-12-50 through 58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act
(4) "Commissioner" means the commissioner
of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102
(5) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed
to practice dental hygiene as defined in Section
58-7-1 1
(6) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in Section 58-7-11
(7) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, loss of
future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor
(8) "Health care" means any act or treatment
performed or furnished, or which should have
been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during
the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement
(9) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or
other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional
services as a hospital, physician, registered
nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife,
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic
physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon,
audiologist, speech-language pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, social
service aide, marriage and family counselor,
practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering
similar care and services relating to or arising
out of the health needs of persons or groups of
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any
of the above acting in the course and scope of
their employment
(10) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under the Hospital Licensing Act
(11) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person
licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse
as provided in Section 58-31-10
(12) "Malpractice action against a health care
provider" means any action against a health care
provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or anting out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider
(13) "Marriage and family therapist" means a
person licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family therapist as provided in Section
58-39-6
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(14) "Naturopathic physician" means a person
licensed to practice naturopathy as defined m
Section 58-12-22
(15) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed
to practice nurse-midwifery as provided in Section 58-44-7
U6\ "Optom*tY\fct" wvfcatt* * pewo^ \\wra*/d to
practice optometry under Chapter 16a, Title 58,
Utah Optometry Practice Act
(17) "Osteopathic physician" means a person
licensed to practice osteopathy under Sections
58-12-1 through 58-12-7, Utah Osteopathic Medicine Licensing Act
(18) "Patient" means a person who is under
the care of a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied
(19) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to
practice pharmacy as provided in Section
58-17-2
(20) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under Part 1,
Chapter 24a, Title 58, Physical Therapist Practice Act
(21) "Physician" means a person licensed to
practice medicine and surgery under Sections
58-12-26 through 58-12-43, Utah Medical Practice Act
(22) "Podiatrist" means a person licensed to
practice podiatry under Chapter 5, Title 58, Podiatrists
(23) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this
state under Sections 5&-12-26 through 5&-12-4&,
Utah Medical Practice Act
(24) "Psychologist" means a person licensed to
practice psychology as defined in Subsection
58-25a-2(3)
(25) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-31-9
(26) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other
legal agent of the patient
(27) "Social service aide" means a person licensed to practice as a social service aide as provided in Section 58-35-5
(28) "Social service worker" means a person
licensed to practice as a social service worker as
provided in Section 58-35-5
(29) "Speech-language pathologist" means a
person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Chapter 41, Title 58, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act
(30) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission
proximately causing injury or damage to another
ISfl
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions —
Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whicheverfirstoccurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except
that
(a) In an action where the allegation against
the health care provider is that a foreign object
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced
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within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body,
whichever first occurs, and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever first occurs
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all
persons regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons,
partnerships, associations and corporations and to all
health care providers and to all malpractice actions
sgainst health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred pnor to the effective
date of this act, provided, however, that any action
which under former law could have been commenced
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within the unelapaed portion of tune allowed
under former law, but any action which under former
law could have been commenced more than four years
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within four years after the effective date of this
act
isTt
78-14-41.5. Amount of award reduced by
amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff — No reduction where
subrogation right exists — Collateral
sources defined — Procedure to preserve subrogation rights — Evidence
admissible — Exceptions.
U) In all malpractice actions against health care
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3(29) in
which damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the
amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid
to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are
available to him, however, there shall be no reduction
for collateral sources for which a subrogation right
exists as provided in this section nor shall there be a
reduction for anv collateral payment not included m
the award of damages Upon a finding of liability and
an swarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court
•hail receive evidence concerning the total amounts
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available
to him The court shall also take testimony of any
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited
oy. or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his
immediate family to secure his right to any collateral
*>urc<» benefit which he is receiving as a result of his
*njury and shall offset any reduction in the award by
•vich amounts No evidence shall be received and no
eduction made with respect to future collateral
•ouroe benefits except as specified in Subsection (4>
<2> For purposes of this section "collateral source''
****)M payments made to or for the benefit of the
Plaintiff for
(a) medical expenses and disability payments
payable under the United States Social Security
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability
act, or any other public program, except the fed-
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eral programs which are reauired by law to seek
subrogation,
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability
insurance, automobile accident insurance that
provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any other similar insurance benefits,
except life insurance benefits available to the
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or
provided by others,
(c) any contract or agreement of any person,
group, organization, partnership or corporation
to provide pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously, and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other
system intended to provide wages during a penod
of disability
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts
paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written
notice upon each health care provider against whom
the malpractice action has been asserted The written
notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons
who received payment, and the items and purposes
for which payment has been made
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs
that provide payments or benefits available in the
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to
pay Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that
such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also admissible The tner of fact
may consider such evidence in determining the
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future
expenses
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health
care provider the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to
amounts paid pnor to settlement or judgment are
preserved as provided in this section All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section
are construed in accordance with this section
itas
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent —
Proof required of patient — Defenses
— Consent to health care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that
what the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider
in an action based upon the provider s failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the
following
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed
between the patient and health care provider,
and
(b) the health care provider rendered health
care to the patient, and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered, and
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(d) the health care rendered carried with it a
substantial and significant risk of causing the
patient serious harm, and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk, and
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the
health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to
give consent In determining what a reasonable,
prudent person in the patient s position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall
use the viewpoint of the patient before health
care was provided and before the occurrence of
any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from
said health care, and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action
against a health care provider based upon alleged
failure to obtain informed consent if
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively minor, or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from
the health care provider was commonly known to
the public, or
(c) the patient stated, pnor to receiving the
health care complained of, that he would accept
the health care involved regardless of the risk, or
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed,
or
(d) the health care provider after considering
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used
reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health
care provider reasonably believed that additional
disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patients condition,
or
<e) the patient or his representative executed a
written consent which sets forth the nature and
purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accepts
the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any,
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health
care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about
the health care and its attendant risks have been
answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient
or his representative, such written consent shall
be a defense to an action against a health care
provider based upon failure to obtain informed
consent unless the patient proves that the person
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or
shows by clear and convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was induced by the
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state
material facts
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or over
from refusing to consent to health care for his own
person upon personal or religious grounds
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any health care not prohibited
by law
(a) any parent whether an adult or a minor,
for his minor child,
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(b) any married person, for a spouse,
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or not, for the
minor under his care and any guardian for his
ward,
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for
his or her parent who is unable by reason of age,
physical or mental condition, to provide such consent,
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over,
(0 any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his
minor brother or sister and
(h) in the absence of <i parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another
as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liability
1976
78-14-6.

Writing required as basis for liability
for breach of guarantee, warranty,

contract or assurance of r e s u l t
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care
provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
obtained from any health care rendered unless the
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set
forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider
197<
78-14-7. A d d a m n u m c l a u s e prohibited in complaint
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of
a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a
health care provider The complaint shall merely
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the premises
1976
78-14*7.1. Limitation of award of nonecononuc
damages in malpractice actions.
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience In no case shall the amount of damages
awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000
This limitation does not affect awards of punitive
damages
isss
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency
fee in malpractice action.
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney
shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a
client seeking damages in connection with or ansing
out of personal injury or wrongful death caused bv
the negligence of another which exceeds 33 1 3% of the
amount recovered
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether
the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment
or whether appeal is involved
isss
78-14-8. Notice of intent to c o m m e n c e action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff
gives the prospective defendant or his executor or
successor, at least ninety days pnor notice of intent
to commence an action Such notice shall include a
general statement of the nature of the claim the persons involved, the date time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof specific allegations
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of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other
damages sustained Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and
m the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be
deemed to have been served on the date of mailing
Such notice shall be served within the time allowed
for commencing a malpractice action against a health
care provider If the notice is served less than ninety
days pnor to the expiration of the applicable time
penod the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice
This section shall, for purposes of determining its
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after
Apnl 1, 1976 This section shall not apply to third
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a
health care provider
ins
78-14*9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers — Insurance commissioner may require joint underwriting authority.
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in
anv part of this state any professional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not readily
available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest requires he may by regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability
policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing medical, surgical or hospital
expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense
incurred basis, including personal injury protection
and medical expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies
ltw
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damage*
in malpractice actions.
11) As used in this section
(a) ,fFuture damages'* means a judgment creditor's damages for future medical treatment, care
or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of boon y
function or future pain and suffering
(b) Tenodic payments" means the payment of
money or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at such intervals as ordered by the
court
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care
provider, as defined in Subsection 76-14-3(29), the
court shall at the request of any party order that
future damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less
amounts payable for attorney's fees and other costs
which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid
by periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages by periodic payments, the
court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair
correlation between the sustaining of losses and the
payment of damages Lost future earnings shall be
paid over the judgment creditors work life expectancy The court shall also order, when appropriate,
taat periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal
to the rate of inflation which the finder of fact used to
determine the amount of future damages, or as mea-
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sured by the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Uuh for all goods and services The present
cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the
fact finder's award of future damages, less any
amount paid for attorney s fees and costs The present
cash value of periodic payments shall be determined
by discounting the total amount of periodic payments
projected over the judgment creditor'6 life expectancy,
by the rate of interest which the finder of fact used to
reduce the amount of future damages to present
value, or the rate of interest available at the time of
trial on one year U S Government Treasury Bills
Before periodic payments of future damages may be
ordered, the court shall require a judgment debtor to
post security which assures full payment of those
damages Security for payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or more of the following
forms
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer,
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified
insurer,
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more qualified insurers,
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the judgment, or
(e) any other form of security approved by the
court
Security which complies with this section may also
serve as a supersedeas bond, where one is required
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future
damages by periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amount
of the payments, the interval between payments, and
the number of payments or the period of time over
which payments shall be made Those payments may
only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment creditor
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or
the assignee of this obligation to make periodic payments, has failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it shall, in addition to the required
periodic payments, order the judgment debtor or his
assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages
caused by the failure to make payments, including
court costs and attorney's fees
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for
all future damages, other than damages for loss of
future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the
judgment creditor Damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by
law, immediately pnor to his death In that case the
court which rendered the original judgment mav,
upon petition of any party in interest, modify the
judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future
damages in accordance with this section
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by a final judgment entered
under this section, the judgment shall be deemed to
be satisfied, and the judgment debtor on whose behalf
the security is posted shall be discharged
isss
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice
actions against health care providers which are
brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
in so far as they are applicable, provided, however,
that this act shall in no way affect the requirements

for filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
ltrs
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception.
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the
provisions relating to the limitation on the time for
commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries,
death or services rendered which occurred prior to the
effective date of this act.
1S7S
78-14-12. D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e r c e t o p r o v i d e
panel — Exemption — Procedures —
Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of panel — Expenses — Department authorized to set license fees.
(1) (a) The Department of Commerce shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985,
except dentists.
(b) The department shall establish procedures
for prelitigation consideration of personal injury
and wrongful death claims for damages arising
out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care.
(c) The proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent
to commencing litigation. Proceedings conducted
under authority of this section are confidential,
privileged, and immune from civil process.
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for prelitigation panel review
with the Department of Commerce within 60 days
after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. The request
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to all
health care providers named in the notice and request.
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel
review under this section tolls the applicable statute
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of
an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
(4) The department provides for and appoints an
appropriate panel or panels to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or on
behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are composed of:
(a) one member appointed from a list provided
by the commissioners of the Utah State Bar, who
is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice
law in this state and who shall serve as chairman
of the panel;
(b) one member who is licensed under Section
78-14-3, who is practicing in the same specialty
as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list
provided by the professional association representing the same area of practice as the health
care provider; or in claims against only hospitals
or their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving in hospital administration and appointed from a list submitted by the
Utah Hospital Association; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor,
hospital employee, or other health care provider,
and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by a unanimous decision of
the members comprising the panel.

(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall
certify, under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of
interest with respect to any matter under consideration.
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels
shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by
rules of the Department of Commerce.
(7) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care providers, the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce may set
license fees of health care providers within the
limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation
panels.
(b) The claimant shall bear none of the costs of
administering the prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16.
lsss
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel —
Rights of parties to proceedings.
(1) No record of the proceedings IB required and all
evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the
parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings. The
hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred
by the panel in this regard are piid by the requesting
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal
rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel, and for
good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except
upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of the parties. The proceedings are confidential
and closed to the public. No party shall have the right
to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, request special or
supplemental participation of some or all parties in
particular respects. Communications between the
panel and the parties, except the testimony of the
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to
all other parties.
(3) The Department of Commerce shall appoint a
panel to consider the claim and set the matter for
panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of a
request.
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel.
ltst
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of
panel — No judicial or other review.
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not
later than 30 days after the end of the proceedings.
The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim against each health care
provider has merit or has no merit and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in
harm to the claimant.
There iu no judicial or other review or appeal of the
panel's decision or recommendations.
isss
78-14-16. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action — Panelist
may not be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from civil liability.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S DECISION

G. KEVIN JONES,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

C-88-273 6

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and
JAMES M. BECKER, M.D.,
Defendants.

The

above-entitled

matter

came before

the

Court

for a

bifurcated trial commencing on November 12, 1991 on the issue
of

whether

the

statute

of

limitations

had

run

as to

the

that

was

plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants.
The

Court

having

considered

the

testimony

adduced, the evidence received, arguments of counsel and the
applicable law has reached this decision.
The

Court

finds

from

the

evidence

presented

that

the

plaintiff, Kevin Jones, knew or should have known that he had
sustained an injury and the causation of the same, on or about
May of 1984.
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Exhibit P-4, a letter dated May 29, 1984, from Dr. Becker
to Dr. Middleton clearly indicates that Mr. Jones had discussed
his sexual dysfunction with Dr. Becker prior to the date of the
letter.

Further, this letter

indicates defendant had been

"told by his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary
to his surgery."
There
plaintiff

(line 24 of Exhibit 4).

is other evidence that
discovered

"the

supports

injury11

and

the
made

finding
the

that

causal

connection between the problem and the surgery in April or May
of 1984.

The Court finds there has been no showing of any

fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's injury by defendants or
anyone else.
Therefore, plaintiff had two years from May of 1984, the
point of discovery, in which to file an Intent to Commence
Legal Action.
The Court finds the evidence is uncontroverted

that the

plaintiff'.s Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not filed
until December of 1987.
It is clear from a reading of Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P. 2d
471 (Utah App. 1989), that a medical malpractice claim must be
filed within the statute of limitations period and that the
fact that a plaintiff's physicians do not render an expert
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opinion

supportive

discouraged
file

a

PAGE THREE

of

malpractice
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and

in

fact

may

suit, does not excuse the plaintiff's

timely

claim.

The

Court

in

Deschamps

have

failure to
v.

Pulley,

concludes that knowledge of a legal injury does not require an
expert opinion confirming malpractice or the "statute would be
tolled

in every case until a plaintiff.

expert medical testimony."
The

Court

finds

that

. . found

favorable

(at p. 475).
discovery

occurs

when

a

plaintiff

knows or should have known he might have a cause of action.
There

is

no

legal

authority

for

the

proposition

that

"discovery" does not occur until a plaintiff is absolutely sure
of the cause of his injury.

For example, in the instant case

there still appears to be a real fact question about the nature
and existence of any sexual dysfunction and the cause.
The Court finds the testimony of Dr. Becker concerning the
plaintiff's condition to be credible.

Dr. Becker stated, "Mr.

Jones has'ill defined sexual dysfunction. . . the cause is hard
to pinpoint.

Objective evaluation has been equivocal in terms

of clarifying what it is and if it exists."
appears

to

still

be

accurate,

based

upon

This evaluation
the

totality

of

testimony adduced.

The Court finds Dr. Becker told plaintiff

of

surgery,

the

risk

of

including

the

risk

of

sexual
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dysfunction, and that the plaintiff knew of this possibility
before surgery; and that he related the sexual dysfunction he
experienced to the surgical process, shortly after undergoing
the second surgery.

The Court finds plaintiff's articulated

desire to have his sperm banked would not have been made but
for knowledge of the risk of sexual dysfunction.
The

Court

has

considered

plaintiff's

demeanor

and

testimony, and finds that the plaintiff's demeanor, attitude
and

the

content

intelligent,

of

careful

his

answers,

man.

reveals

Plaintiff's

reflected a great attention to detail.
further

notes

plaintiff

is

concept of informed consent.

a

lawyer,

him

to

answers

be

in

an

court

The Court so finds and
who

understands

the

The Court finds the plaintiff had

access to the Mayo Clinic pamphlet and read the same.

The

Court finds that the plaintiff clearly testified that in 1984,
he knew of changes in his sexual function or "system", i.e., no
ejaculent and diminished erections (Ex. D-4).
Plaintiff's
masturbated
•surgery,

and

to

specific

testimony

"test" his

again

after

sexual
the

at

trial

function

second

was

after

surgery,

that
the

and

he

first

that

he

noticed and reported sexual problems in April or May of 1984.
Plaintiff testified

that after the "testing",

following

his
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first surgery, he felt relief and stated,
through that one okay11.
one"

was

clearly

a

"at least

I got

The plaintiff's reference to "that

reference

to

surgery.

Plaintiff

also

testified that he masturbated again after the second surgery
and discovered what he perceived to be sexual dysfunction.

The

plaintiff and his parents, Veda and Garth Jones, testified that
he disclosed the sexual dysfunction to them in May of 1984 and
the surgery was discussed as a cause at that time.
testified

that

he

called

Dr.

Becker

and

Garth Jones

asked

questions

regarding the "consequences of this operation" in relation to
the sexual dysfunction.

The evidence supports that in late

April or May of 1984, the plaintiff told Dr. Becker he was
experiencing no ejaculation.
Becker

discussed

possible

The testimony reflects that Dr.
causes

at

that

time

and

made

referrals to Dr. Middleton and Dr. Hammond to further explore
any

sexual

dysfunction.

All

of

the

physicians

to

whom

plaintiff was referred, were advised of the dysfunction problem
and plaintiff's concern about it being linked to the colon
surgery.
In Exhibit D-17, the deposition of Dr. Becker, Dr. Becker
stated

(at p. 98), that he told the plaintiff, referring to

plaintiff's complaint of sexual dysfunction, "It is unlikely to
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be the result of surgery."

However, Dr. Becker goes on to say

that surgery as a cause was discussed and

"surgery was never

ruled out11 as a possible cause of the plaintiff's problems.
appears that plaintiff

was

on notice

It

at this time of the

problem and the potential causes, including the surgery.
The
didn't

Court
relate

surgery until

finds
his

that

while

sexual

September,

the

plaintiff

dysfunction

to

testified

nerve

injury

he
from

1987, that is belied by the other

evidence and by the totality of his own testimony.

Further,

the Court finds that the plaintiff's contention that he didn't
think sexual dysfunction was a real risk, and wasn't advised of
the same, is not credible in view of the totality

of the

testimony, including plaintiff's testimony that he considered
and requested his sperm be banked.
The Court finds that when the plaintiff got Dr. Dayton's
opinion in September 1987, this only confirmed the plaintiff's
own conclusion formed in 1984 as to the problem and its cause.
The Court finds that the plaintiff found other theories on
causation

unacceptable.

For

example,

plaintiff

found

Dr.

Hammond's explanation, of a possible psychological cause for
the

dysfunction,

believed

this

to

incredible
be

the

and
cause.

"unsatisfactory"
The - plaintiff's

and

never

actions,
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including his failure to pursue psychological treatment, makes
it

clear

that

psychological.

plaintiff

never

believed

his

problems

were

Exhibit D-ll establishes that in early 1985,

Dr. Franklin L. Smith, a urologist, was asked by the plaintiff
if surgery had caused his problem.
The fact that Dr. Becker did not acknowledge in 1984 or now
that

plaintiff

has

a

permanent

sexual

dysfunction

problem

caused by surgery, is immaterial to the issue of plaintiff's
knowledge.

Dr.

Franklin

L.

Smith's

testimony

referred

to

plaintiff's request for information regarding the nexus between
surgery

and

sexual dysfunction

Doctor

indicated

the

(See Exhibit

plaintiff

reported

P-14) and this
sexual

problems

starting "after the second operation in February of 1984".
Finally,

Terry

Stoker's

testimony

supports

the

1984

discovery by plaintiff.
Ms.

Stoker

testified

that

"contemplated suing" repeatedly.

the

plaintiff

indicated

he

She clearly states threats of

a lawsuit were made as early as 1985.
The

Court

finds

the

continuing

treatment

doctrine

is

inconsistent with the statute of limitations passed by the Utah
legislature.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that counsel for
the

defendants, Mr. Williams,

Findings

of

Fact

and

is to

Conclusions

consistent with this Decision,

of

prepare
Law,

and submit

more
and

them

detailed
an

Order

as required

under the Third District Court Rules of Practice.
Dated this

18th

dav of December, 19jrt:i

v - W ^ /V. v^vftK
LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
G. KEVIN JONES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS O F LAW

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and JAMES
M. BECKER, M.D.,

Civil No. C88-2736
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter was tried to the Court, without a jury, on
November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In accordance with $ 78-12-47, UCA
(1953 as amended) the trial was limited to the issues pertaining
to defendants' statute of limitations defense.

Plaintiff was

present at trial and represented by his counsel of record.
Defendants were represented at trial by their counsel of record.
Plaintiff and defendants adduced evidence through witnesses and
exhibits and each rested. The Court having heard closing arguments
from counsel for plaintiff and defendants and having reviewed the

trial briefs submitted by plaintiff and defendants hereby enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In

1981 plaintiff

ulcerative colitis.
-A2ulfddliur—and-

was

diagnosed

as

having

chronic

He was treated for that condition with

Prednisone

by

Dr.

Clifford

Harman,

a

gastroenterologist, through December 1983.
2.

In November 1982 plaintiff consulted with Dr. James

Becker at the University of Utah School of Medicine concerning
surgical options for treatment of his ulcerative colitis, including
specifically the ileoanal anastomosis procedure. Between November
1982 and December 1983 plaintiff's parents also visited with Dr.
Becker regarding surgical options for treatment of plaintiff's
disease.
3.

In October 1983 plaintiff visited the Mayo Clinic in

Rochester, Minnesota where Dr. Huizenga, a gastroenterologist,
confirmed the diagnosis of chronic ulcerative colitis and entered
plaintiff into a study protocol for an investigational drug (5 ASA)
for the treatment of ulcerative colitis.
4.

Plaintiff did not respond favorably to the 5ASA treatment

and in December 1983 his ulcerative colitis became so severe that
he was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital.

In the opinion of his

treating gastroenterologist, Dr. Harm an, medical therapies had been
exhausted and surgery was necessary to save plaintiff's life.
5.

In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the

surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the
-2-

ileoanal anastomosis procedure after having been fully informed
concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the
alternative procedures.
6.

Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual

dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was
a risk of the procedure.
7.

In January 1984 Dr. Becker explained to plaintiff that

the ileoanal anastomosis procedure would be performed in three
separate operations.
8.

On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal

anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff.
9.

The first phase of the procedure was completed without

complications.

Following completion of the first phase and prior

to the second phase of the procedure, plaintiff masturbated to test
his sexual function. At that time he felt relieved and stated "at
least I got through that one okay", referring to the first surgery.
10.
phase

of

On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second
the

ileoanal

anastomosis

procedure,

the

mucosal

proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum.
Again, prior to this procedure the risks were explained to
plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction.
11.

In April or May 1984 plaintiff discovered what he

perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation
and diminished frequency and quality of erections.
-3-

12.

In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual

dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker.

At that time he

reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery.
13.

In May

1984 Dr. Becker

referred

plaintiff

to Dr.

Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction.
14.

Since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with

various physicians, plaintiff has repeatedly causally related his
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure
performed in February 1984.
15.

Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined

sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively
determined, phjertlvg^evaluatioag-fcavm been-eiMlvnral tEMrmrfl of ~~
rTnr1fTlng_fhe prrrrtrri ^YHfimction.^
16. Beginning

in

May

1984

and

continuing

thereafter,

plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known that the second
surgery performed in February 1984 was a possible cause of his
perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of
action against defendants.
17.

Plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories

of causation suggested by defendants or any other physicians.
Specifically, plaintiff

rejected

and did not

rely upon

any

suggestion that there may be a psychological cause of his perceived
sexual dysfunction.
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18.

Plaintiff was never misled or deceived in any manner

concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual dysfunction.
19.

Defendants did not fraudulently represent or conceal any

information

relevant

to

plaintiff's

treatment,

recovery

or

perceived sexual dysfunction.

^
j?\ J'

2G-—BE4—Mereil—BaytOT—-did—not—provide

plaintiff—any

sLnfarmatioa—in—September—±9*7—concerning- possible
^plaiafci£f^--pereeived^ex

causes of

of which plaintiff was not

—previously-aware2$.

During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing

defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his
surgeries.
2i.

On June 28, 1984 the third and final phase of the

ileoanal anastomosis procedure was performed and completed.
2$.

All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by

defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center.
24.

Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time

employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the
University of Utah School of Medicine.
2fir. Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not
served until December 4, 1987.
26. This action was commenced April 26, 1988.
Zjn

Plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years

after he knew and reasonably should have known of his perceived
sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of
•5-

his surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice
against defendants.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The applicable statute of limitations in this case is S

78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended).
2.

Plaintiff's action was not commenced within the time

required by S 78-14-4 and his action is therefore barred.
3.

The two year limitation period provided in S 78-14-4

commences when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has an
injury and that he or she might have a cause of action based on the
injury, commencement of the limitation period is not delayed until
a plaintiff is advised by an "expert" that a valid claim exists or
otherwise knows with certainty the cause of the injury or that the
defendants were negligent.
4.

An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of

limitations when the complaint is filed, but in this case the
action was not timely whether the commencement of action is deemed
to be December 4, 1987 when the Notice of intent was served, or
April 26, 1988 when the Complaint was filed.
5.

in addition to the relevant findings of fact, the Court

concludes as a matter of law, that defendants did not fraudulently
conceal any alleged misconduct and that plaintiff was not prevented
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from discovering any misconduct on the part of defendants by any
fraudulent concealment.
6.

The "continuing treatment doctrine" is not applicable

since the legislature passed § 78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended).
7•

The continuing treatment doctrine would not apply to this

case, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, because of the Court's
factual findings that plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and
information pertaining to his alleged injury and possible causes
during

the time he was being

treated by defendants

which he

possessed at the time he commenced this action and he was not
misled or prevented from obtaining any information as a result of
the continuing treatment.
8.

Because plaintiff's action was not commenced within the

time required by S 78-14-4, the applicable statute of limitations,
it is not necessary for the Court to rule on defendants9 defense
that the action was not commenced within the shorter period of time
required by S 63-30-12, UCA (1953 as amended).
DATED this

^ ^

xfay of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT;

..eslie A. Lewis
District Judge
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

PATRICIA C. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
defendants The University of Utah, The University of Utah Hospital
and Medical Center and James M. Becker, M.D. herein; that she
served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Number
C88-2736, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County) upon
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
Robert F. Orton
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on
the

^

day of January,

1992.

QfcZLft.iAL
Patricia C. White j
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

o

day of January,

1992.

he State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
HARVI LYNN CHILES
10 Exchange Place, ntft Ft.
Sail Lake CJ«y. Utah fttm
My Commusion Expiraa
S*pMmoarS. 1W3

STATE OF UTAH
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